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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
THE 60TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UDHR 
jUANEMENDET 
·1. INTRODUCTION 
Numerous atrocities and affronts to the dig:ruty of human 
beings continue to happen sixty years after the world agreed to the 
Universal Declarntion o.f Human Rights ("UDHR"). Tn itself, that is 
a sobering reminder of the challenges ahead, but it does not 
diminish the importance of the landmark thRt we comrnen.10rate. 
The UDHR was conceived both as a guiding principle to orient the 
behavior of govermnents and as a fundamental agreement across 
cultures and ideologies regarding the inherent dignity of each 
h uman person and the equality among them. In assigning to the 
Declaration tbe nature of Cl "common standard of achievement," 
the framers may have wanted to indicate these two different1 but 
not incon1patible meanings. It is a common standard in the sense 
that the rights and principles enumerated are an irreducible 
mininium applicable under any circumstance and not subjt::ct to 
any form of relativism- cult ural, ideological, etc. ft is a standard to 
the effect that behavior of governments can and will be judged in 
comparison to it. The reference to a standard of nchievenu:nt is 
meant to signi fy two things: (1) that, as of 1948, there :is no goi·ng 
back on these principles through interpretation, rationalization, 
exceptionalism, or exigencies of the cirCLtmstanceSi and (2) thal full 
compliance with these standards was not a reality in 1948. fn this 
sense, the UOHR was m.eant, at the time jt was passed, to indicate 
a blueprinl for hm.v governme.nts should relate to their citizens, 
President. lnternationcll Center for Transitional justice. 
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and that such a blueprint vvas to becon1e a reality through specific 
government action and international cooperation over time. 
Even if full compliance with the UDHR is far from being 
achieved six decades later, the Declaration is still the source of 
much of the progress that has indeed happened in this period. 
Many governments do indeed try to adjust their conduct towards 
their citizens to the principles embodied in the UDHR. The UDHR 
is the inspiration for advanced human rights treaties, for decisions 
of courts and other organs that have indeed moved the standards 
forward, and for the creation of multilateral mechanisms that 
afford redress to victims of hun1an rights abuses when remedies 
are unavailable in the domestic jurisdiction. More importantly, the 
Declaration is the ultimate source of legitimacy for collective action 
in the realm of human rights by States other than the territorial 
government, by the United Nations, and by other organs of the 
international comrnunity, as well as by a growing and ever more 
influential moven1ent of international civil society. In that sense, 
perhaps the most im.portant reason to celebrate its commemoration 
is that the Declaration has given birth to a movement across 
nations and cultures and has bccon1e an indispensable factor in 
policy formulation and decision-making. The human rights 
rnovement is now a rich and diverse network of governme.nt 
agencies and officials, multiiCiteral organizations and units, and of 
civil society organizations that strive to promote, protect, defend, 
and fulfill human rights across the globe. 
2. THE STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT I 'THE HUMAN RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 
The human rights doctrine has developed extensively since 
1948, keeping pace with the growth and riclmess of the human 
rights movement. Throughout the stages of that development, the 
UDHR has remained effective and current. In the 1950s and 1960s, 
en1phasis was placed on the need to make the UDHR principles 
legally binding and to clarify their meaning in relation to State 
obligations. This "standcrrd setting" stage culminated with the 
adoption and later extensive ratification of the two International 
Covenants: (1) the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights ("ICCPR") and (2) the International Covenant o n  Economic, 
Social, and Cultural I�ights ("ICESCR"). The "standard setting" 
stage continued with important treaties such as the Convention 
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Against Torture and, m.ost recently, a Convenlion on Enforced 
Disappearances, open for ratification only in the last year. 
A second stage consisted of the effort to build mechanisms able 
to identify speciJic cases ot non-compliance could bring tl1ern to the 
attention of international advisory, Investigatory or adjudicatory 
bodies, which co·uld provide an effective remedy to the victims. 
This "implementation'' stage included efforts not only at the 
United NCltions, bul also through regional inter-governmental 
organizations. This slagc, however, is not complete, because there 
is a vasl discrepancy between n1echanisms- in terms of 
effectiveness, geographic coverage and juri�prudcnti,ll output. 
Neverlheless, progress tn this area is unmistakable, even if also 
very uneven. 
ln recent decades, lhe human rights movement has shifted in 
its efforts to apply human rights principles to .situations of armed 
connict and polilical violence, stemming from the objective reality 
that much hun1an suffering is caused not only by State agents but 
also by non-State actors that apply violence i_n order to achieve 
power. As n result, a third st<�gc in the development of hmnan 
rights law and practice is "!ntcrnatlot1c:d crimin<:1l justice" -an 
atternpt to hold individuals criminally responsible for human 
rights violations of such widespread or systematic nature that they 
constih1te genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. 
Of course, the foregoing identification of stages in the 
development of human rights is overly schematic. [n practice, 
standard setting, implementation of State responsibilit�', uncl the 
international crimimll justice regime all continue today in different 
forms and huge gaps cmd chailenges affect each one of them. From 
the perspective of standard setting( lhc most recent trend is to 
apply universal principles to the particu L:u circumstances of 
categories of victims like women, children, indigenous 
populations/ discrete ethnic or religious nunorities, and persons 
with clisE�bilities. This trend does not negi'lte the universal 
character of the rights enuml'ratecl in the UOHR, but rather fleshes 
out the p01rticular ways i.n which sucb. rights must be applied to 
persons ond collectivities in special circlllnstanccs. Tn this sense, 
the most recent instruments enrich the human rights doctrine by 
giving special meaning to the cardinal principle of CtJI!n!ity and non­
discri llli nn lio11 in the exercise of rights. 
In the realm of implem.entatiun of State responsibility, much 
could be said for the contributions of organs hke the European and 
Inter-America,n Courts of Human Rights, the fnter-American and 
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African Commissions of Human Rights, and several of the U.N. 
treaty bodies and "special procedures" that are Charter-based. To 
highlight only one possible contribution of these bodies to the 
human rights canon, it deserves notice that their collective 
judgmE!nts, reports and commentaries have resulted in the creatior1 
of a very rich doctrine of due process of law -specifying what 
procedures States must establish to ensure that persons have a 
right to be heard and to defend their interests, not only in criminal 
proceedings instituted against them, but in all administrative or 
judicial instances that affect the enjoyment of rights. 
The recent progress in international crin1inal justice deserves 
special mention. For years, the international human rights 
movemen.t adhered to the notion that the UDHR and its progeny 
applied to the responsibility of States for actions of its agents that 
violated its standards. In that respect, the punishment of 
individuals who abused their authority as State agents vvas 
considered to fall within the realm of domestic law and \vas not 
included among the remedies demanded by international law. 
Likewise, crimes committed by armed and organized groups 
outside the control of the State were considered crin1es of the 
domestic jurisdiction and therefore also outside the scope of 
concern of the international community. This interpretation was 
and is formallv correct-and in the case of some inter-
J 
governmental bodies is strictly a matter of mandate- but it  
ignored the reality that non-State actors who challenge the State 
son1etimes commit atrocities that are equally grave in their effects 
on human beings. In this misplaced orthodoxy, the human rights 
movement was offering a flank to those who accused it of 
"selectiive indignation," and a ready-rnade rhetorical excuse for 
governments who wished to ignore its denunciations and 
demands. 
1n the 1980s, human rights organizations monitoring and 
reporting in situations of armed conflict started applying the Jaws 
of war, or international humanitarian law, to all sides. In addition 
to preserving their impartiality and objectivity-both crucial to 
their credibility and effectiveness- this expansion amplified not 
only the universe of beneficiaries but also the !cgat and moral basis 
for human rights advocacy. Indeed, the laws of war have an even 
longer lineage than international hmnan rights law and are better 
codified (most recently in the Geneva Conventions o£ 1949 and 
their two Additional Protocols of 1977). They contain the same 
main purpose as the UDHR and human rights treaties- the 
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protection of the humC!n person from abuse and violence. ln that 
seJr.se, thcv constitute a code of conduct for armies. and combatants 
J 
c�nd a set of fundam�ntal rights for civilians etmght in the special 
circumstuncc of 1111 c�rrned conflagration. 
The Geneva Conventions squarely spell out lhe obligation to 
investigate, prosccu te, and punish the most egregious \'iolatfons of 
the laws of Wclr. lf at first it was thought that th<1t obligation 
Jpplicd only to international wars, for the last two dc·cades the 
norm has expanded to apply also to wars not of C\n inbernC1tional 
chm,Kter. For that reason, the inten1ational hume1n rights 
movement incorporated the "struggle against impuni t�·" in its 
a rsena 1 of demcmds for redress and remedies, as a con�l�q ucnce of 
establishing th<'lt a viole1tion had indeed occurred. Mo·rc or less 
contemporttneously, militMy dictatorships and c1l1Lhoritarian 
regimes were being replaced with elected governments in the most 
recent wave of democratization. The newly democratic societies 
confronted legacies of massLve or systematic hun.1.an rights 
violations <1nd the open wounds they had left in the social fabric, 
and a powerful demcmd arose from victims, and from society at 
large, that those legacies should be dealt with appropriJtely. To 
the extent that many of those crimes were crimes against humanity 
under in.tern<1tional lcnv, they were equivalent to war crimes 
because they triggered <m obligation to investigate, prosecute and 
ptlnish them, Stmling in tlr.e societies where these tectonic shifts 
were occurring, civil society turned its attention lo advocacy h>r 
effective means to break the cycle of impunity. Jn due course, 
those demands were upheld by decisions of internolional juditic1l 
bodies. ln this regard, a central tenet of human rights advocacy is 
now the ''right to justice" -a legitimate demand by the victims and 
society to see justice done in accordance with principles of fair trial 
and du<> proo:-ss. 
1n the 1990s the international community borrowPd a page 
freom these experiences and incorporated justice through 
international cooperation and speci�1ly cre,�tcd int,ernational 
courts, like those for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. 
Some saw the creation of these ad hoc courts by tl1e Sen1rity 
Council as a poor substih1te for more robust action to slop the 
killings, or as embarrassed 171en culpns for not t(lking rn.ore tin1ely 
action. In fact, the integrity, independence and professionalism of 
the jurists selected for the tribunals' prominent posihons soon 
turned them into formidable instruments of justice. As their 
credibility grew, the international community turned to the 
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creation of a pern1anent international criminal court. The debates 
sponsored by the United ations enjoyed ampie participation from 
member States and attracted the interest and activism of a strong 
movement of civil society. The adoption of the Rome Statute for an 
International Criminal Court ("1CC') in July 1998 is the turning 
point in the evolution of the hurnan rights canon on two rnajor 
grounds: (1) the international community gave itself an instrurnent 
to break the cycle of irnpunity vvhen States more directly 
responsible are unwilling or unable to afford justice; and (2) 
participating States oblige themselves to cooperate with the ICC 
and in so doing acknowledge that genocide, war crimes, cmd 
crimes against humanity trigger an affirmative obligation to 
investig;ate, prosecute and punish those responsible. 
3. NEW }-lOI�!ZONS OF HUMAt RIGHTS PROTECT!Of'\ 
Accountability for massive or systematic crin1es is one of the 
new horizons of human rights protection. There are others, of 
course. Chief among thern is the challenge to implement econo111ic, 
social, nnrf cultural rig!Jts with the sarne level of effectiveness and 
success that the movement has achieved with respect to civil and 
political rights. At bottom, this challenge reflects the need to 
remain faithful to the broad agreement across cultures and 
ideologies that g21ve rise to the UDHR in 1948. It is also a way to 
abandon the idea of "generations of rights" vvhich, whatever the 
original intent of the authors, has resulted in practice of 
considering economic, social, and cultural rights as "second 
category" rights. The challenge consists in finding ways to rnake 
"progrE�ssive realization" (the stand21rd used in the ICESCR) rnore 
than a platitude or aspir<'ltion, through effective public policy 
measures. It also demands an effort of in1agination and legal 
thinking to devise formul21s by which these rights can be 
"justiciable," i.e., subject to specific court-ordered redress in case of 
violation. But it cannot be denied that the difficulty does not stem 
simply from an ideological preference for civil and political rights 
and a neglect of social justice concerns. There are objective reasons 
why economic, social, and cultural rights are more difficult to 
implement and fulfill than civil and political rights, or that their 
implement21tion requires a different path. The refinement of the 
principle of equality and non-discrimination possibly offers sorne 
clues to make these rights justiciable, and constitutional courts in 
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young den1ocracies (South Africa, Colombia, A rgentint�) are 
showing the wt�v to their effective realization_ 
Another "new horizon'' of human TighLs protection is related to 
the struggle again:-;! in1punity, ,1nd more broadly to the idea of the 
right to a remedy as ,, dorninc1ting principle in current human 
rights len"'- It is gcner,-111:· called '/trnnsitional justice" and it 
concentr,ltes on the appropriate response societies and States owe 
to their citizens in the face of a legacy of massive or systemaUc 
ilbuses_ lL comprises, of course, lhc vmious forn1s of internlltional 
criminal justice mentioned eadier. But il goes further to focus also 
on efforts of dornestic courts to live up to the Stales' obligation not 
to let those crimes go unpunished. rn addition, �rcmsitional justice 
uttempts to bridge the jncvitc1ble "impunjty gaps" ldt by the 
impossibiliLy to cover .:�11 pt)lt·nti;ll events/ all potenti<ll ddcndants 
<md all potential victim<; of crimes that, by definition, are n1assive 
11r systematic Jn this rcg,�rcl, lransitionJl justice !earns from the 
practices and policies t1f societies tbnt have recently experienced 
transitions from dictatorship to democracy or fron1 conflict to 
peace, and offers suggeslions to adapt those experiences to new 
challenges, particularly in the <!rea:::; or truth-seeking, prosecutions, 
reparations for the victims, Jnd inslitutional refonn. 
Transitional justice is sometimes mistetkenly accused of 
promoting a token form of justice or of settling for "jLLslice light" or 
for "soft" versions of Jccountability. It is true that some 
government leaders promolc their version of a false and forced 
''reconciliation'' or argue in favor of vague notions of "restorative 
justice" as alternatives fm what they consider retributive justice. 
When they do so by invoking transitional justice they are not 
acting in good faith to comply with legal and moral obligatior1s; 
their proposals are window dressing for policies of impunity. 
Serious practitioners of transitional fustice insist on good faith 
understanding of the Stnte's obJigalions in the face uf massive or 
svstematic crjmes_ They make it clear that crimincd prosecutions, 
at le,'lst those bearing the highest responsibility, hc1ve to be central 
to <my program to restme faith in institutions and give victims 
access to justice_ Of course, tr,msitional justice does not end there 
becduse it stresses a comprehcnsivc. balanced, integrated .:1ppronch 
to justice, to truth, to repMuiit�ns ,md to instilutional reform. 
In this contexl, it is worth dwelling on the concept of 
"reconciliation/' especially because jt has so frequently been 
misused or misunderstood. ln sorne coLmtries, notably in Latin 
AmeriCC11 proponents of impunity have frequently cloaked their 
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argum.ents in the euphemism of reconciliation . . This has been the 
justification for blanket am.nesties and for refusals to cooperate 
with truth commissions. Under the guise of reconciliation, clearly 
identified perpetrators of egregious crirnes are allowed to retain 
their positions of power and influence in the same institutions that 
vvere the instruments of their atrocities. It is no wonder then that 
Latin American victims and human rights activists react to the 
word "reconciliation" with rejection . Nevertheless, it is imperative 
to distinguish between this false reconciliation imposed between 
victin1.s and perpetrators, and the reconciliation betwee·n factions in 
a political or ideological battle that is necessary to set the country 
toward a new, more hurnane <md dcmocrC\tic way of sett]jng 
political differences. The lC1tter version of reconciliation is the 
uitimc1te objective of a policy of transitional justice, and it can only 
be cJchievcd if the country embarks on an honest, cour<:1geous effort 
to reckon with the past through truth, justice, reparations and 
institutional reform. 
In addition, it must be recognized that in some places the 
atrocities had a distinct ethnic, racial or religious dirnension, like in 
the Fonner Yugoslavia, Rwanda and now Darfur. In tl1ose cases, a 
comprehensive policy of transitional justice will have to deal with 
ali four avenues of accountability, but in addition it will be 
necessary to establish certain other initiatives that can fairly be 
labeled "reconciliation . " By these initiatives, I allude to the need 
tor talks and arrangements between ethnic groups for purposes of 
property restitution, land rights, water rights, grazi.ng rights and 
the right to return to original places of abode. These very specific 
reconciliation initiatives are necessary- together with the classic 
transitional justice n1echanisms- if we are to build a f uture in 
which the next generations of a certain ethnicity are not to be 
blamed for the crim.es committed in the past by those who claimed 
to act on its behalf. 
Transitional justice thus encompasses most of the actions and 
operations thC'It are necessary to bring C'l country back from the 
effects of indiscriminate violence and civilian victimization that so 
frequently characterize modern day wars. Institutions and 
procedures devised to discover and disclose the truth, as well CIS to 
organize effective prosecutions that arc impartial, independent and 
fundamentally fair to the defendant as well as to the victims are 
central to the effort to reorganize the State after conflict. The same 
can be said of policy decisions to offer reparations to victims that 
are non-discrim.inatory and whose scope and quantum recognizes 
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their plight and their dignity, and of the necessary rebuilding of 
mmed and security forces, the judiciary and other institutions of 
the State so that in the future citizens can be expected to trust them. 
ln this sense, through transitional justice practices the human 
rights movenH.�nt enters the realm of post-conflict reconstruction 
t!nd contributes from its unique perspective to evolving notions of 
htm1an development. Furthermore, because the debate about 
transitional justice usually begins well before the end of the 
conflict, human rights activists novv work constructively with 
conflict resolution specialists and humanitarian relief 
organizations. The substance of such conversations ccm help 
ensure that peace negotiations incorporate the legitimate demands 
of victims for justice vvithout provoking more conflict and more 
human rights abuse. Justice is, in this concept, an ingredient of 8 
peace that has a better chance to be durable, precisely because it 
consults the interests of those affected by both war and peace. 
4. CHALLEl\CES TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVE:V!Ei\:T 
For a!! the progress that has been accomplished since the 
enactment of the UDHR, there are still challenges that continue to 
bedevil the human rights movement. Prevention of violations is 
perhaps the most important one. Based on the UDHR Clnd other 
instruments, the international human rights movement has 
devised a very effective way to respond to violations as they 
happen, through perm.an.ent monitoring and reporting and, more 
recently, by paying special attention to remedies. Even as the 
movement was in its infancy, the idea that there should be a way to 
prevent violations from happening i n  the first place was a focal 
point, especially in the wake of the tremendous-and generally 
irreparable-human suffering caused by violations of human 
rights. As the movement perfected a methodology of monitoring 
and reporting that relied on impartiality and objectivity, 
predictions of bad behavior by governments and regimes had to be 
avoided, lest it be accused of bias against them.. This trend 
undoubtedly resulted in the professionalism and credibility of 
burnan rights organ.izations, but it did little to equip them to 
eng<:1ge in effective prevention. 
There is no question thC!t reliability and timeliness in reporting 
hun•an rights violations as they happen does contribute to 
a-vvareness and reaction, and in this fashion can be turned into 
effective preventive tools. But prevention requires two or three 
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additional steps beyond accurate analysis of facts on the grou n d .  l t  
require�; careful research o f  trends toward deterioration a n d  deep 
familiarity with the background to each conflict.  With these tools 
effectiv(= early warning can be accomplished, assuming that such 
warning can be d irected to organs and authorities that are in fact in 
a positiio.n to add ress deteriorating situations. Yet, even early 
warning is not s u fficient to prevent mass atrocities; it is also 
necessary to bring fon.vard suggestions for e21rly 21ction that are 
reasonably tailored to Cllter the course of events so that irnpending 
atrocities may be averted. 
The inabil ity of the i n ternation21l community to prevent the 
catastrophes in Rwanda and Srebrenic<'l in the 1990s, i ts 
helplessness in the face of millions of deaths in the Dem.ocratic 
RepubLic of Congo in the late 1990s, and the tepid a n d  inconsistent 
response to the ongoing massacres in Darfur in this decade have 
given rise to a new preoccupation with prevention, at least with 
prevention of  genocide and mass atrocity. Some democratic States 
l ike Svveden and Switzerland have championed the idea that 
genocide can and should be prevented, and have fostered rigorous 
thinking among academics and activists and initial steps within the 
United Nations to i ncorporate prevention of genocide a n d  rnass 
atrocity into the regular operations of the Secreta riat.  I was 
privileged to be asked by Kofi Annan to be his first Special Advisor 
on the Prevention of Genocide, 21 task that T discharged on a part­
time basis between 2004 21nd 2007. It is gratifying to report that the 
recommendations arising fron1. my experiment in genoci d e  
prevenltion have been implemented, and now the office h a s  a full­
time Special Representative, a better-defined mandate and more 
human and material resources. 
The ideas about an operative concept of prevention of genocide 
have immediate precedent in two parallel trends i n  the 1990s and 
in the present decade. One is the promotion of a "culture of 
prevention" within the U nited Nations. Although the early focus 
was on prevention of conflict, the principles developed i n  those 
early studies have been immensely helpful i n  their application to 
impending mass atrocities. The other trend is the growth of a 
net-work o.f genocide scholars \..vho are erudite experts on past 
genocides but also are intent on dra·wing lessons learned from the 
study of those human catastrophes. These genocide scholars have 
worked with governments and international organizations i n  
promoting a better interpretation of unfolding events. They are to 
be credited with drafting indicators, predictable stages of genocide, 
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a n d  accelerdting or conlc1ining factors drmvn from those 
experiences . There is ample debate about whether early warning i.s 
crucial to effective action, as many scholars maintain that factors 
leading to genocide develop s low ly and ci t plain sight. They 
demonstrate th("J t most recent genocides or genocide-like situ,ltions 
were predicl<�ble, and in fe�ct predicted, ;;mel that the lack of 
warning WclS nol a factor in lhc ine1bility to respond effeclivcty to 
those signc.1ls. 
NevertheJc.:;s, early \N<:Hning remains a central lhen1e of 
prevcnbve <:H.:tiun, .-.nd the indicators and signs gleaned from past 
experiences are < 111 indispensable tool in the arsenal of prevention. 
Lack of politicc1l \\' i l l  to clCt is almost a h\·ays the main reason for 
genocides to h.1ppcn before our eyes. But ea rly vvarning and cMly 
action can contribute to form the poli tical will that t8 i ls to exist in 
the abstract. 
ExperienCL' cllsn shows that it is unwise to engage in endless 
deba tes about whl'ther events unfolding in <1 corn�r of the world 
constitute genocide or something different, as in the discussions 
that  have prccluchxt more effective responses to the Darfur crisis. 
The determi n,ltion of vvhethcr some killings constitute genocide 
depends largely on the pt:rpctrators' intent to destroy an ethnic, 
religious, racial or nc1 t ional-origin community in whole or in part. 
I t  is legitimat� to d isti l l  th<1t i n te n t  from the facts on the ground, 
but that task should be left lo courts of law that can act after the 
fCtct to impose putlishment. It is cmnpletely unhelpful to the effort 
to prevent some events from deteriorating into genocide. Waiting 
to act until  a l l  elements of genocide arc in place disallows the 
prevention of genocide in the first Place. The Secrelary-General' s 
instructions to the Special Advisor spccifice�lly ordered me to 
refrajn from qualifying a situation as genocide. lnstead, my 
successor Rnd l vverc instruclt'd to act to prevent mass atrocities 
before we can tell whether they wil l  ultimately be genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity or other forrns of serious and 
massive human rights violations. 
Prevention 0t mass atwcities hils been given a large boost by 
the en1erging norm of "Responsibility to Protect," embodied i n  th<.:' 
ou tcon1e clocu mcnt of the U.N. Summit ConferL'nce of 2005, which 
was approved b�, a L:u·ge number of heads of StRte Rnd of 
government. Th3t document was later ri:ltified by a General 
Assembly resolution, and it Iivas preceded by seminal docurnents 
by lughly respected experts, a l l  of which WCIS sponsored by Dl.E'Iny 
democratic governments in the first half of this decode. 
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U n.fortu nately/ the docLrinc is under serious push back from some 
States/ representations in the Un i ted 1 a t ions, based on the 
perspective of near-absolute notions of sovereignty. The disrute 
over the meaning of the outcome clonunent is fueled by cJjstrust of 
the org(H1S that vvi l l  n1ake decisions when the responsibility to 
protect triggers internatit•nal ,Ktion. The deba lc about the 
contours and scope of the Rt:sponsibi l i t y  to Protect doctr i ne is 
ongoi ng and un(ortunatcly it h,1s delayed efforts to make the 
doctrine operational in the 1.vorkings of the Uni ted Nations 
Secretariat and its field missions. But Secretarv - Ce ne ra l  Ban. Ki.-' 
Moon bas created an office of Cl Specic1 l Ad\·isor Oil th is ma tter, 
who works closely with the office of Prever1tion of Genocide a n d  
l�!ads the ongoirtg discussions ,l mnng member States, civil society 
and U.N.  offi cia ls . The cloctrinl' hciS e1ttractcd the i nterest of the 
human rights movement and the development of ne'"' advocacy 
nnd rese<�rch organ izations thc1t hold great promise for an effective 
use of this evolving norm i n  the ncar future. 
In the mea ntime, lhese early experiences in the prevention of 
mass t�trocities are yield i ng some lessons, even if they should be 
subject to further study a n d  corroboration with facts on the 
ground. Tn my experience, the internationa l community must 
engage in a sustained, unified d i p lomatic e ffort to contain the 
damage of ongoin g  conflict and stabilize each si tuCi tion w i th a view 
tel more l ong-term solutions. Tlus means that coordinated and 
simul taneous efforts have to be d isplayed in lour distinct areas: (1) 
protection; (2) humanitarian clssistance; (3) accountability; and (4) 
peace talks. 1 stress thal measures in each area must be 
dyna n• ica l ly and flexibly adapted, tailored to sh ift ing s ituations on 
the ground, and coordinated so tha t they are not subordinated to 
each other. Effective action in each of them should not be held 
hostage to conditions imposed by rec<.1lcitrant governn1ents , such 
ElS vvas the case i n  D2n·fur w here the Khartou m regime has 
ma naged to delay progress in each while holding out for 
concessiions in another. 
ln this context, protection met�ns the deployment of armed 
neutral con tingents capable o£ s tC1 nd ing in the path of those who 
would a ttack defenseless clvi l i<ms . [t a lso means that civil ian 
observers and Cldvisers musl uccomp<�ny those forces w i t h  the 
cape1city to document viobtions, bri ng them to the a ttention of 
local interlocutors and report them up the chain of U.N. 
representatives Oil the ground and at headquarters. Humanitarian 
assistan ce not on l y reverses the trend towards loss of life but also 
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constitutes a n1easure of protection because of the presence of 
specia lized civi lian personnel that are witness to the bets on the 
ground . Accountabi l i ty is necessary to b reak the cycle of i m p u n i ty 
for the abuses al ready committed, because impuni ty breeds 
distrust iJ1 tbe target population a n d  constitu tes .:m incen ti ve for 
perpetrators to cDm m l t  atrocities again.  Final ly, tlw underly i ng 
conflict that g,we occasion to the situ8tion of i mp en d ing genocide 
must be addressed not on ly to ach ieve a fr.:1gilc ce<"!se- fi rc or truce, 
bu t also to look for :st>lu tions to its root causes. 
If i n  the past it WciS genera l ly believed thilt peace <.1 gr��enwnts 
always trum ped any dernands for j ustice, there is novv a clear trend 
to find ways in 1.vhich justice ond peace can be i n tegrated to 
solution� that certainly w i ll be rnore compte'\, b u t  the1 t have a 
better chlmce to achieve a lclSting peace. This trend ha::; been fueled 
by lhe normabve developments i n internati0nJI justice mention8d 
earlier, w ith the tipping point being the Rome Statute for an 
I n ternational Crimjnal Court. The recognition of an nblig;:-�tion to 
prosecute mass a trocities and the crea tion of an institution<�! 
instrument to i m plem.cnt i t  when States are un wi l l i ng or unable to 
do so has resulted in a veritable paradigm shift in the efforts to 
brin g confl icts to a peaceful resolution. justice is no longer the 
poor cousin of peace, to be left behind in order to yield to the 
blackmail of  perpetrators who will  not stop cornm i tting atroci ties 
unless assured of impunity. Justice is now considered a v a lm.' to be 
pmsued for its own worth and o u t  of respect for the dignity of 
victims, as well as an e�sentia1 elem.ent of peace arrang;ernenls 
designed with a l l  stakeholders i n  mind. Undoubtedly, the task of 
peacema kers is lhus made more complicated, but peacemakers 
themselves recognize tba t confl icts that seem to lend therns,el ves to 
apparently easy solutions are precisely the conflicts tlha t are 
rcsu m.ed, perhaps even more savagely, after a brief i n lerlude. 
These dilemmas of peace and justice .have a ttracted the human 
rights com munity <111d have put them in frequent and ongoing 
dialogue with humanitarian organi:zations and with spec ia l ists in 
confl ict resolution 21nd mediation. At the san1e time, the realization 
that fu l l  measures of justice w i l l  be very d i fficult to realize under 
the best of ci rcumstances have res u l ted in the need to explore 
transitional justice 1.nechanisms to a p ply a notion of just ice that 
integrates judi cial and nort-judicial ini tjatives vvith a better dmncc 
to bridge the impunity gap a n d  satisfy the demn nds of l arger 
circles of victi,ms. 
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5. co 'CLVSION 
In this evolution of the normative framework of international 
law relating to human rights and i n  the growth of the multi­
cultural international movement that applies it on an ongoing 
basis, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has played a 
large, indeed inuneasurable role. It is significant that a six ty yenr­
old document has lost nothing of its vitality or significance to 
current events and new challenges. Contemporary instruments 
l ike the Convention on the Prevention and Punish1nent of the 
Crirne of Genocide and the Geneva Conventions on the lcnvs of 
war are also live instruments of precious force and u tility in the 
times we live in. Unlike the Genocide Convention, the UDH R is a 
comprehensive document designed to deal with every aspect of 
life, and freedom of individual and collectivities i1t1 peacetitne as 
well as in states of emergency. Tl1e Geneva Con.ventions are a 
codification of previous instruments, and uses and customs of war 
developed over centuries, whereas the UDHR is a sern.inal 
instrument that inaugurated a whole new field of intcrnational lavv 
about the relationship of the human person to the authority of the 
StG�te. Because of these differences, it is remarkable that the UDHR 
has not been eclipsed by the subsequent elaboration of its norms 
by new treaties. On the contrary, the binding instruments in the 
universal as well as in the regional realms have only highlighted 
the wisdom of the norms contained in the UDHR. 
For this very reason, it is to be expected that the UDHR will 
continue for years to come to be a guiding light as we face the 
challenges ahead. It will be not only an inspiration but also a 
source of authoritative normative force as we build more effective 
machineries of redress and protection of hum.an rights, as we 
ernbark on more aggressive promotion of standards through 
human rights education, and as we deliver on the promise of 
prevention of violations before they occur. 
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